Given their presuppositions, Magnus, Stewart, and Mileur have written a paradoxical book. As writers chronicling their readings of Nietzsche, they straddle the distinction between readers and writers that figures so prominently in their analysis of Nietzsche. Although this is ironic (no doubt consciously so), the book might be seen as a dramatization of some of its own theses, a forceful demonstration of the problematic gaps between readers and writers. Thus, perhaps this distinction itself should be seen as a self-consuming concept, for the reader must imaginatively bridge the terms of this distinction even to recognize how the two roles are different. Furthermore, in portraying Nietzsche as a writer ("not a sage, teacher or pastor," as they insist on 185), are the authors not creating their own fiction in the fashion of the readers they criticize? The book presents the fiction of writers who are not readers, with readers who must nonetheless be writers if they are to see the value and suggestiveness of this "writerly" depiction of Nietzsche.

As a text that presents itself as the work of three authors, *Nietzsche's Case* also creates a fiction akin to that it observes in *Zarathustra,* Nietzsche's self-styled "Book for All and None." *Nietzsche's Case* pretends to speak evenly "for all" of its authors, eliding the possibility that the "author" may differ from moment to moment. Yet the book hints that it speaks "for none" of the authors individually, that it instead grew out of a dynamic exchange that developed a life of its own, somewhat independent of the incommensurable perspectives of its three differently disciplined participants.

Magnus, Stewart, and Mileur ask which came first, Nietzsche's writing or his thought. Seeing most previous commentators as presupposing that the thought precedes the writing, they suggest that we consider the alternative possibility. Perhaps Nietzsche's thought evolved as a consequence of his experiments in writing. Readers of *Nietzsche's Case* will likely vary in their views about the plausibility of this suggestion. Nevertheless, Magnus, Stewart, and Mileur's authorial experiment has itself engendered a new stage in the evolution of thought about Nietzsche. Paradoxically, it signals a burst of hope for productive communication, even among those as disparate as writer and reader.

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SENSORY QUALITIES. By AUSTEN CLARK. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. xiii, 250.

In recent years an intricate literature devoted to the sensory qualities or "qualia" of perceptual experience has developed in philosophy. Much of

this literature has proceeded in neglect and, often, ignorance of important scientific findings in perceptual psychology and neurophysiology. Austen Clark's *Sensory Qualities* is a timely and welcome exception. Its aim is to focus attention on how psychologists and sensory physiologists approach the issue of sensory qualities and to show that their approach is in principle adequate to explain qualia in nonqualitative terms. Clark's strategy is to analyze the structure of current psychophysiological explanation and then defend it against various philosophical objections. The presentation is informative and well argued, providing the best philosophical explication that I have seen of the conceptual structure of standard psychophysical explanation. Furthermore, Clark makes excellent use of another important work largely neglected in the qualia literature, Nelson Goodman's *The Structure of Appearance.* With these resources he is able to provide original treatments of many topics, including the intrinsic and extrinsic features of sensory qualities, the semantics of sensory quality terms, and spectrum inversion. *Sensory Qualities* is thus an important and much-needed contribution to the philosophy of psychology, one that subsequent discussions of qualia cannot afford to ignore.

In Clark's analysis the main task of psychophysiological explanation is to derive "quality spaces" for perceiving subjects from sensory discrimination data and then to "intrepret" those spaces neurophysiologically. A quality space is a multidimensional order, where the number of dimensions corresponds to the number of distinct qualitative attributes in a given sensory modality. Given various types of discrimination data, one tries first to derive the dimensionality of the quality space and then to identify the neural processes that subserve the discriminations in each dimension of the space.

I cannot do justice in this brief review to Clark's precise analysis of the logic behind such explanations. But roughly they have the following structure. The first step is to determine "identity of effects." One takes a stimulus that presents a particular sensory quality to a subject in a particular situation and shows that it has the same physical effects on an early stage in the subject's sensory system as does a "paradigm" stimulus that has and is perceived to have the same quality. The identity of effects need not be complete, but it must be sufficient to establish that the two stimuli are "globally indiscriminable"—that there is no third stimulus discriminable from just one of them, thus making the first stimulus indiscriminable from the same class of stimuli as is the paradigm. The second step is to show that the global indiscriminability of the two stimuli suffices for their "qualitative identity." The argument for this step is rather intricate: it relies on considerations from information theory and Nelson Goodman's account of the relation of identity for qualia. The upshot of the argument is a definition of qualitative identity in terms of global indiscriminability.

The explanation up to this point is circular because it requires reference

to a paradigm stimulus instance of the sensory quality to be explained. The reference to the paradigm must therefore be eliminated. Psychometrical construction and neurophysiological interpretation of a quality space are what is supposed to accomplish this step. There are a number of techniques for constructing a quality space from discrimination data, but multidimensional scaling (MDS) is one of the most powerful and widely explored. (Clark gives a nice introductory description of MDS in an appendix.) MDS supplies various methods for deriving the dimensionality of a quality space from data about the discrimination of relative similarities (triples lists having the form: x is more similar to y than to z). Deriving the dimensionality of a quality space determines how many distinct ways sensations can vary qualitatively in the particular sense modality, but it does not determine what those dimensions of variation are. To do this one must identify the neural processes that subserve the discriminations in each dimension, thus giving a neurophysiological explanation of the structure of the qualitative similarities in the modality. The final step is to identify sensory qualities as places (regions or volumes) in the neurophysiologically interpreted quality space. It is this identification that enables one to eliminate any reference to paradigm stimulus presentations of sensory qualities in explaining how things appear qualitatively to the subject. Clark's account of the qualitative content of sensory states thus turns out ultimately to be a "proximal" (internalist) version of functionalism: sensory qualities are defined by the relations of qualitative similarity and discriminabilty that constitute the quality space, but bear only a contingent relation to distal stimuli.

I have two general criticisms of Clark's presentation. The first concerns his use of the psychophysical notion of a quality space. In advocating his proximal version of functionalism, Clark does not take sufficient precaution against a sensationalist reification of this notion. Quality spaces must always be abstracted from environmentally situated perception, and, depending on the context, different quality spaces can be abstracted. For example, the dimensions in which colors are appropriately scaled depend on the modes in which colors appear (surface, aperture, etc.). In general there is considerable evidence that sensory qualities are not judged independently of their environment, as many psychophysical scaling models have assumed, but rather in relation to their spatial and temporal contexts.[1] It seems quite possible that when these complications are taken into account, the psychophysical explanation of quality space may no longer conform to Clark's internalist model.

Second, Clark argues that qualia are the "differentiative attributes" in

[1]Gregory R. Lockhead, "Psychophysical Scaling: Judgements of Attributes or Objects?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 15 (1992): 543–601.

sensory encodings of stimuli, and that neurophysiology tells us what these attributes are. But although he claims to defend this position against "all the extant philosophical objections" (10), he nowhere fully confronts the basic yet deep philosophical question: Is psychophysiological explanation in principle sufficient for a complete understanding of qualia, or does such an understanding require having the relevant sorts of experience? He does end the book with a very fine reply on behalf of psychophysics to Thomas Nagel's famous treatment of subjectivity and sensory qualities, but he stops short of confronting the question head-on. Given the high quality of Clark's work, it would have been nice to know his thoughts on this question.

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THE RELIABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION. By WILLIAM P. ALSTON. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. x, 148.

This is a beautifully written and argued book. Its principal aim is to show that epistemologists cannot have one of the things they most want: a convincing, noncircular defense of the reliability of sense perception. The bulk of the book is devoted to canvassing, and dismissing, attempts to establish the reliability of our perceptual practices, but in the last chapter Alston tries to tease out a positive lesson from the failure of these attempts.

Alston divides the arguments for perceptual reliability into the a priori and the empirical. The latter, he shows, are often infected with epistemic circularity, in that they presuppose the reliability of the very perceptual practices whose reliability they are meant to establish. The former are designed to avoid this problem, but Alston insists that none of them comes close to being convincing.

By 'reliability', Alston means counterfactual, not mere statistical, reliability. So, to be convincing, an argument must show, without epistemic circularity, that our customary ways of forming perceptual beliefs, what Alston calls our "sense perceptual practices" (or "SP" for short), "would yield mostly true beliefs in a sufficiently large and varied run of employments in situations of the sorts we typically encounter" (9). He doesn't try to make precise the meaning of 'mostly', 'sufficiently large and varied', or 'typically'. He apparently thinks that on any plausible reading of these expressions, there aren't convincing, noncircular arguments for the reliability of SP.

Alston considers a number of arguments for the reliability of SP that are